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1he Judgements of Regency Literature
Charlotte Sleigh  University of Kent
In the English-speaking world, both the modern novel and modern science trace 
their roots to the same period, roughly the latter part of the seventeenth century. his 
commonality is no coincidence. Both were based upon the same set of values that 
were in the process of being negotiated in the context of an increasingly bourgeois-
dominated society. he key – and closely related – values in question have been 
convincingly articulated as virtue in the case of the modern novel, and as trust in 
the case of modern science.1 Just as authority and credibility on the part of the 
experimenter was an ongoing theme for science through the next three centuries, so 
narratological changes in literature encouraged readers to treat its claims in a variety 
of ways. Texts could present themselves as authoritative, or could invite varying 
degrees of belief, doubt or dialogue with the reader. Readers could vary in their 
compliance with interpretative norms. It is my contention that texts, no less than 
physical forums such as the Royal Institution or the Geological Society, provided a 
space to negotiate the same issues of authority that were crucial to science.
here are some important potential criticisms regarding a focus on literary form. 
One is that formalists can be overly concerned with authorial intent; another is that 
formalism can be historically anachronistic in trying to it novels from diferent 
eras into a single framework of formal typology. However, one can take conidence 
in the fact that forms, when stable, are a shared and understood framework for 
generating meaning.2 One can also ofer the possibility of treating form histori-
cally. hroughout modern history, discussions about meaning, judgement and 
epistemology have continually taken place, in the areas of literary criticism, science, 
and jurisprudence to name but three. he literary critic can exploit this by taking 
historical debates and using them as formal keys to literary texts from the period in 
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question.3 his is the modus operandi of this paper. It takes two models of judge-
ment from the Regency period and uses them to understand the epistolarity of two 
texts. he models are those of Jeremy Bentham and William Whewell, and the 
texts are Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) and homas Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus 
(1833–4).
he range of Bentham’s scholarship bridged the thematic poles of the Regency 
period. On the one hand, his radical democracy meshed naturally with the philo-
sophical and political radicalism of the Enlightenment. On the other, his tendency 
towards authoritarianism sat well with the political anxiety of the early nineteenth 
century. hus he was a fertile source of interpretative inspiration for readers caught 
between the same socio-political pulls of radicalism and order. Such readers included 
those of Frankenstein, which has been chosen as a case-study as a widely-read text 
that obviously engaged with questions of selhood in the light of science. Its tergi-
versation between Romantic indulgence and Enlightenment restraint relects the 
ambiguity of Bentham’s political position, while its nested construction makes it a 
suitable candidate for discussion in terms of literary form.
Whewell was, in pragmatic terms, the most important philosopher of science 
of the nineteenth century. His position of power and inluence meant that his 
epistemological standards were widely disseminated amongst practising scientiic 
researchers; the popular, educated interest in science meant that most readers were, 
directly or indirectly, aware of his moral ideals for judgement. Carlyle’s idealism 
(and social background) makes him a natural twin for Whewell. His ambivalent 
meditation about the suitability of idealism as social doctrine very much mirrors, 
and intersects with, the political dilemmas of gentlemen of science in the 1830s.
In this essay Bentham and Whewell are analyzed for the frameworks they 
provided for reading and judging texts in the Regency era. Bentham’s readings are 
presented as an experiment in radical democracy that was almost, but not quite, 
efaced by the idealist mode introduced a generation later by Whewell. hese 
modes of reading, and the textual judgements that they entailed, are used to help 
understand the epistemology of scientiic evidence in the Regency era. It is claimed 
that both literary and scientiic judgements were, at root, political, and furthermore 
that judgement in the courtroom formed their model. Multiple levels of nested 
and epistolary iction enabled readers to rehearse and attend to political arguments 
about the nature of scientiic evidence: evidence that, in an era of high political 
tension, decided the case about nothing less than their own selhood. Each of the 
essay’s two parts is introduced by a diferent contested body, a problematic self that 
linked the judgements of truth and iction, the sciences and the law.
Bentham and Shelley: Democratic Judgements
On an icy January morning in 1803, George Forster was found guilty of the murder 
of his fourth child and estranged wife.4 Mr Bushwell, his boss from a coach-making 
workshop, had come to visit him in custody before the trial to see if he could help. 
Forster begged him to go to the Green Dragon at Highgate and ask if anyone 
/LW	+LVWBBB6OHLJKLQGG 
he Judgements of Regency Literature
3
remembered him being there on the evening of the murder, taking a glass of rum and 
asking ater a Mrs Young. his, he hoped, would be his alibi. Mr Bushwell obliged, 
but it turned out that he was not allowed to give his evidence in court. Silenced by 
the power of the law, Forster listened helplessly as the judge pronounced the most 
dreaded verdict: hanging and anatomisation.
Forster’s body was cut down from the gallows and hurried down High Holborn 
to the Royal College of Surgeons at Lincoln’s Inn Fields where it was received by a 
lamboyant self-publicist, an Italian natural philosopher named Giovanni Aldini, 
eager to show of his gruesome theories.5 Aldini attached metallic rods to the 
corpse’s face and body and by the power of galvanism produced all kinds of contor-
tions in Forster’s rapidly cooling body.
Over two hundred years later, is impossible to tell whether Forster was really 
guilty of murder. he sad and sordid events for which he was prosecuted were not 
remarkable enough in their day to generate a great deal of historical documentation. 
One thing, however, is for sure: if the legal reformer Jeremy Bentham had had his 
way, Mr Bushwell would have been able to stand up in court and allow the jury to 
hear evidence that Forster had been in the Green Dragon on the night in question. 
Who knows, things might then have turned out very diferently.
he stories of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) and George Forster (?-1803) are 
interwoven on a number of levels: science, jurisprudence, and literature. Both 
highlight questions of evidence and belief. Bentham advocated a radical reform of 
the law, sweeping away the power of the legal profession and allowing the voice 
of the people – such as Mr Bushmill’s – to be heard more clearly in the process of 
justice.6 It was all a question of whose evidence was to be trusted. Bentham and 
especially his literary protégé Bowring extended the challenge to science: ‘In the 
map of science, the department of evidence remains to this hour a perfect blank. 
Power has hitherto kept it in a state of wilderness: reason has never visited it.’7 As 
jurisprudence decided the fate of the individual, so science would determine the 
nature and hence fate of personhood in general.
he other key participant in the story – Aldini, and his taboo-breaking experi-
ments – would undoubtedly have sprung to mind for many of Shelley’s readers. 
Radical atheist philosophers had for some time been propounding the materialist 
philosophy that there was no such thing as the soul. he human body was nothing 
more than a machine, as the French philosopher de la Mettrie had put it. Now, 
Aldini and others suggested that it was nothing more mysterious than electricity 
that animated the body; that made the diference between a corpse and a living 
person. Mary Shelley recalled conversations on the British materialist contro-
versy during the famous house party at which Frankenstein was hatched, and as 
Marilyn Butler writes, the debate’s public notoriety during the ive years or so ater 
 Frankenstein’s publication ensured that the novel’s irst reading public interpreted 
it in its light.8 his article, however, does not so much consider the case on which 
readers’ judgement was invited – whether the body had a soul or whether it could 
be described in materialist terms – but rather the processes by which their judge-
ment was obtained. Entering the narrative from multiple points of witness, the 
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reader joined Shelley in weighing up the evidence produced by the materialists.
Picking up on the famous words of Diderot, literary critics have emphasised 
how epistolary novels like Shelley’s were considered to ofer a direct insight into 
their characters, and thus to teach truths about humanity and life itself.9 For some 
eighteenth century commentators, this made them a dangerous thing when it came 
to those vulnerable readers otherwise known as women.10 Novels, and epistolary 
novels in particular, were leaky. heir stories did not stay safely on the page; they 
whispered in their readers’ ears, forever changing their perspectives on the world 
and even their personalities. A woman needed to be given the right books to read, 
claimed James Fordyce in his Sermons to Young Women, for reading would afect 
a woman’s passions as well as providing a model to govern her practice. Mary 
Wollstonecrat too railed against the efects of silly novels on unthinking women, 
albeit for very diferent reasons. Unlike Fordyce she did not propose forbidding 
them, nor even ridiculing them en masse. Rather,
if a judicious person, with some turn for humour, would read several to a young 
girl, and point out both by tones, and apt comparisons with pathetic incidents 
and heroic characters in history, how foolishly and ridiculously they caricatured 
human nature, just opinions might be substituted instead of romantic senti-
ments.11
Wollstonecrat’s conidently democratic attitude towards reading contrasts with 
Fordyce’s didactic model. She did not believe that an epistolary novel would whisper 
irresistible temptations in its reader’s ear, like some kind of literary serpent. hrough 
the process of discussion, knowledge claims could be judged.
A dialogue could be achieved between two readers of a book, and such conversa-
tion was both the maker and marker of good eighteenth-century taste.12 Could this 
paradigm of dialogue be extended further? Could a single reader have a conversa-
tion with a book? Could a book even contain a conversation within itself ? his is 
the intratextuality that Wollstonecrat’s ‘tones’ might seem to suggest, and it is also 
the manner in which historian John Brewer treats eighteenth-century journals, texts 
in which the writer/reader became ‘a spectator of [him or her] self ’.13 At this point 
it is appropriate to return to the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, because besides 
forming an important type of literature, the adjective ‘epistolary’ also designated 
a common type of evidence in the courtroom. Bentham’s formula for courtroom 
‘conversation’ intersected with the broader issues of judgement that also applied to 
literature.
Bentham had an exceptionally low opinion of the existing system of the law, 
frequently referring to lawyers’ ‘sinister interest’ in making the system as compli-
cated, long-winded and hence lucrative as possible.14 Many of these nefarious 
technicalities were concerned with the exclusion of certain types of evidence 
from the courtroom; Mr Bushwell, for example, could not relay the alibi from the 
Green Dragon because it would have been hearsay evidence. here were all sorts of 
witnesses forbidden to give evidence in court on the grounds that they were incom-
petent: infants, the elderly and the insane, to name three categories. Bentham’s 
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overriding mission in the Rationale of Judicial Evidence was a radical expansion 
of permissible evidence, for justice could only be served by making absolutely all 
evidence available to the court. A person might be unreliable in one respect but still 
reliable in another. False testimony could be snifed out – and in fact, the nature of 
a falsehood might help to highlight the truth. (If a person lied, then their reasons 
for doing so would help lead to a true explanation of the case.) Underlying all of 
this was Bentham’s instinctive faith in the average person’s ability to make sound 
judgements. In a deliberately domestic analogy, he compared the work of the court 
to the cook’s judgement as to whether a leg of lamb was properly cooked. Anyone 
could do the work of a judge.
Out of all the obfuscating technicalities of the courtroom, Bentham singled 
out written or epistolary evidence as particularly heinous, whether in the form of 
oicial documents or written witness statements provided in response to a judge’s 
request. Bentham thought the practice asinine because it was so much easier for 
witnesses to lie on paper than in person. Jurors could not even know if the author 
was who he claimed to be. By dividing the person as writer from person as witness, 
it reduced his sense of responsibility for telling the truth:
When a man speaks in his own person, he considers what he says to be his own 
discourse, and himself to be in the highest degree responsible for it .… When he 
is made to speak in the third person, to speak of himself as he would of another 
person, the idea of responsibility is apt to be in a considerable degree fainter. He 
scarce knows in what character to consider himself; whether in that of the author, 
or only of the subject of the discourse …. Self-deceit conceals from him his own 
image in the character of the author, bids him consider himself as the subject, and 
look for the author in the person of the professional scribe by whom he is thus 
spoken of, and who, in fact, is the author of the words.15
hus for Bentham, the fact of the matter was always embedded in its expression. In a 
court room, the truth of a fact was always embedded in the reliability of the witness’s 
statement. he fact could not make itself known to the court in any other way; it 
must always come via a person, whose credibility must be weighed up. Bentham’s 
preferred alternative to epistolary evidence was the viva voce: the appearance of a 
witness in person before the judge for cross-examination. hat way everyone could 
see whether they seemed shity or reliable, and whether their story was consistent 
under questioning.
It is widely known that writers of epistolary novels in the eighteenth century 
actively presented and published them in a way that implied they were genuine 
troves of letters and journal entries.16 he name of the author was oten not attached 
so that there was no sense of the volume being a work of iction. Rather than the 
‘I’ being split into untrustworthy subject and narrator, as in Bentham’s critique of 
epistolary evidence, subject and narrator in the epistolary novel were artiicially 
conlated into a single person. Was epistolarity, then, inherently deceitful in the 
novel, as Bentham claimed it was in a court of law? Obviously, one cannot judge 
novels in the same way as courtroom evidence for the very simple reason that the 
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former do not purport to be a communication of fact. Leaving aside the unsubtle 
and unlikely possibility that the epistolary novelist was attempting nothing more 
than a hoax, one has to consider his or her text as invitation to a more complex 
process of witnessing and judgement than that occurring in the courtroom. What 
is being judged is not, as in the case of a hoax or a trial, the actuality of the events 
narrated. Instead it is a judgement on virtue concerning the moral economy of the 
tale.
On irst sight, it would seem that Bentham’s criterion of transparent witness 
could never be achieved by a novel because there is no possibility of its interroga-
tion; one cannot generally have a conversation with the author. Yet in one sense, this 
was precisely what the multi-layered, epistolary novel permitted. If it purported to 
be a univocal guide such as Fordyce feared, then it was at fault. If, however, it were 
constituted as layers of ‘tone’ and ‘apt comparison’, a diferent result obtained. It 
would become a mixture of witnesses in its diferent layers. By having the layers 
speak to one another, the text could suggest spaces in which the reader might also 
participate. he reader’s participation could be simulated by the text itself,17 and 
the real world could become the outermost layer to the tale. he moral or virtuous 
nature of the text was the point of commonsense judgement at which the characters 
and the reader could mutually airm one another’s testimony.18
hus the spirit of Bentham’s comments on narrative might be respected:
Abstain from those artiicial forms [i.e. writing in the third person] which probably 
had deceit and depredation for their object, and certainly have never had any other 
than mischief for their efect. Read as you would speak, is the fundamental precept 
in the art of reading: it is the precept of good taste. Write as you would speak, – at 
any rate in the same person as you would speak in, – is a law in the enactment of 
which good taste concurs with probity.19
Writing in an artiicial form (the irst person, in the case of the novel) was not 
deceitful if it were used to invite conversation, the tasteful, drawing-room equiv-
alent of interrogation. Bentham’s was a democratic approach to evidence, just as 
Wollstonecrat extended democracy to literary criticism. Like Wollstonecrat, he 
did not believe that anything should be withheld from the reader or listener. Both 
gave credit to ordinary people (women and jurors) and their ability to deal with 
evidence and other tales, however deceitful or nefarious. Both had conidence that, 
by comparing the diferent narratives one against the other, their intra- and inter-
textual corroborations and inconsistencies would cause the truth to emerge.
Frankenstein is constructed as just such a multiple narrative: ive stories nested 
within one another. Margaret Saville’s trove of letters relates the tale of her brother 
Captain Walton, who tells the story of Victor Frankenstein; Frankenstein recounts 
the creature’s autobiography, which includes the history of Saie. his construc-
tion means that the reader journeys inward to the centre of tale before emerging 
to discover the ultimate fate of Frankenstein, his creature and Walton, and to reach 
uneasy conclusions about human materiality and the soul. Shelley added the outer 
layer of the story when re-working it for publication in 1818, so it was a carefully 
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thought-over conceit. Highlighting its form, she explained it thus: ‘Every thing 
must have a beginning …and that beginning must be linked to something that went 
before.’20
‘I now hasten to the more moving part of my story,’ says the creature, as Shelley 
conducts us to the very inmost shell of her tale (77). It concerns the history of 
Saie, a young woman who escapes from the oppression of life in a Turkish harem 
to ind freedom in Christian Europe with Felix. Amongst its meanings, this story 
resonates with the outer shells that contain it in terms of frustrated partnerships: 
Saie and Felix; the creature and its wife; Victor and Elizabeth; and Margaret and 
her brother. Where there is no partnership, there is no dialogue; where there is no 
dialogue, there is no accountability. he saintly Clerval always desired ‘the inter-
course of others’ (108), but Frankenstein was dangerous because in his isolation he 
was free to follow his mind’s unhinged promptings.21 For us, as for the creature, our 
dialogue comes through reading:
I can hardly describe to you the efect of these books … As I read … I applied much 
personally to my own feelings and condition. I found myself similar, yet strangely 
unlike the beings concerning whom I read, and to whose conversation I was a 
listener (86).
he power of reading was that it could emulate conversation. Epistolary and 
layered books were conversations overheard, where the reader’s responses could be 
rehearsed and weighed.
here are several important moments in Frankenstein when Shelley’s characters 
draw attention to their reciprocal acts of witnessing, all centred upon texts. he 
creature listens as Felix reads improving literature to Saie, and shares a sympathetic 
reaction to the text: ‘I heard of the discovery of the American hemisphere, and wept 
with Saie over the hapless fate of its original inhabitants … the words induced me to 
turn towards myself ’ (80). his description of the creature learning and identifying 
with Saie through Volney’s Ruins of Empires presages the reader’s learning and 
weeping with Saie (whose story follows on immediately) and, ultimately, doing so 
also with Frankenstein. Just as Saie and Felix are unaware of the creature’s ‘reading’ 
of them, so too is the author unaware of each reader taking in their words. By impli-
cation the reader has a textually-mediated relationship with the author just as the 
creature has with Saie.
Saie’s tale of betrayal by her father is evidenced as true by a trove of letters which 
the creature claims to have in his possession; he promises to give them to Franken-
stein before he departs in order to ‘prove the truth of [his] tale’ (83). hese written 
tokens prove to be crucial to Walton’s judgement of Frankenstein:
His tale is connected, and told with an appearance of the simplest truth; yet I own 
to you that the letters of Felix and Saie, which he shewed me … brought to me 
a greater conviction of the truth of his narrative than his asseverations, however 
earnest and connected (146).
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hus Shelley draws attention to the power of writing to facilitate correct judge-
ment; it is more reliable than raw sentiment, or is at least a necessary counterpart 
to the latter.
he most obvious dialogue between layers of the novel is that between the narra-
tives of Walton and Frankenstein. ‘You seek for knowledge, as I once did’, Franken-
stein warns the Captain, ‘and I ardently hope that the gratiication of your wishes 
may not be a serpent to sting you, as mine has been’ (17). Yet when the crew comes 
to Walton begging him to abandon the voyage, it is Frankenstein that persuades 
them to go on. hough dying, his eyes briely sparkle once more as he presses upon 
them the glory that awaits if they would but continue. he men are ‘moved … 
[and] unable to reply’ (150); Walton hopes that their courage will return and that 
they will consent to press on. In the 1831 edition of the novel, Walton’s attitude 
to Frankenstein borders on hero-worship, giving greater pointedness to the latter’s 
warning to ‘avoid ambition … in science and discoveries’ (152).
here is a peculiar moral power to tales within tales. he reader, in judging 
the tale within the tale, becomes part of the moral economy of the whole and is 
accountable to the moral judgement of the outer tale (Walton and Frankenstein). 
he creature tells Felix’s blind father a story about a man whose friends reject him 
because of prejudice. De Lacey expresses dismay, but does not succeed in applying 
the moral of the story. Just then, the rest of the family return and lash out at the 
hideous monster before De Lacey has a chance to explain. His failure to educate his 
family by use of the creature’s fable perhaps hides a dark doubt about the power of 
iction at the centre of the novel.
By the temporal end of the novel, Frankenstein has had his sensibility partially 
restored by the tales he has encountered. He has moments of ‘benevolence and 
sweetness’ (14); his manners are ‘conciliating and gentle’ (15). ‘He is so gentle, yet so 
wise; his mind is so cultivated’ (15). he hope is that Walton can efect this transfor-
mation more completely. Again, it is interlocution with tales that ofers salvation. 
Walton admits candidly:
Now I am twenty-eight and am in reality more illiterate than many schoolboys 
of iteen. It is true that I have thought more and that my daydreams are more 
extended and magniicent, but they want (as the painters call it) keeping; and I 
greatly need a friend who would have sense enough not to despise me as romantic, 
and afection enough for me to endeavour to regulate my mind (10).
Such a friend, as his irst sentence hints, must be the regulating power of literacy.
If the reader has been following the story carefully, he or she will see that 
Walton should not listen to Frankenstein’s words but should rather learn from his 
downfall. he inconsistency between Frankenstein’s words and fate are only too 
clear. Frankenstein has proved himself an unreliable witness; morally, he is not to 
be trusted. Walton should not repeat the abandonment of Elizabeth with his sister 
Margaret. Applying Frankenstein’s moral to Walton allows the reader to carry the 
moral through one further layer and out into the real world, if they so wish.
However, the novel is by no means a straightforward morality tale, as  countless 
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plodding critics have contended. Walton, Frankenstein and the creature are 
dangerous characters, and all of their testimonies should be treated with caution. 
Moreover, the romantic in Shelley revels in the horror of the events. he reader is 
drawn to Frankenstein’s lashing eyes and Walton’s outrageous ambitions. Silently, 
the reader urges both to press on, to see what happens next – otherwise, the book 
would be laid aside. he reader does not dutifully proceed towards the moral, but 
actively simulates their own dialogues of judgement.
Frankenstein, then, is a novel composed of dialogue whose layers interrogate one 
another: a series of debates about ambition, honour and appearance, and above all, 
about the soul. A Benthamite perspective sees all these characters and their textual 
layers of interlocution as collectively constituting a dialogue in which the reader, 
the outermost layer of storytelling, also participates. he tale of the creature dealt 
a series of powerful blows against political and religious conservatism. It did not 
suggest that such a monster could really be made, but it suggested that the real 
materialist science underpinning Frankenstein’s endeavour had some uncomfort-
able implications for how the reader should see him or herself. Perhaps, if materi-
alism were true, everyone was a soul-less monster. he old, comforting myths of 
moral judgement were stripped away, with no certain replacements. he radicalism 
of the new science appealed, but it ofered no easy answers. Because of the looping 
process of textual airmation, the real world itself became a layer of the text, and 
the debates applied there too. Frankenstein invited a radically democratic reading; 
Bentham would have approved of its good taste.
Whewell and Carlyle: Idealist Judgements
In 1830, the Iron Man arose in its terrible beauty from the inventor’s bench, 
stronger and quicker than any mortal. By the power of his mighty, mechanical arm 
he crushed the resistance of men, until they became docile subjects of his rule. his 
was no Frankenstein’s creature, however; no iction but rather reality. he Iron Man 
was the name given by factory workers to a device (properly known as the self-acting 
mule) that could take yarn ater it was drawn and twisted, and wind it at the correct 
tension into the shape of a cone. Before its appearance, the mule-spinners’ job had 
been a skilled one and in consequence was highly paid. However, the spinners had 
fomented industrial unrest in the 1820s, and by 1830 Richard Roberts’ invention 
had turned these troublemakers out of work, replacing them with the device and its 
semi-skilled operators. he new employees were expendable and could not strike 
for higher wages.
he Scottish doctor Andrew Ure thought the Iron Man was wonderful.22 In 
fact many of the phrases in this section’s opening paragraph – intended by him as 
unambiguous terms of praise – are drawn from his 1835 description of the device.23 
Besides his medical training, Ure, like Frankenstein, had studied extensively in 
chemistry and natural philosophy. And, like Frankenstein – or at least like Aldini – 
in 1818 he went on to demonstrate the efects of electricity on the body of a hanged 
man.24 Ure believed that the principles of chemistry and mechanics exempliied 
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in such demonstrations were vital knowledge for industrialists, topics upon which 
he lectured them for around 25 years. he factory system was a perfected body; 
Frankenstein’s time would have been better spent in Lancashire and Derbyshire 
than at the Swiss University of Ingolstadt. his was a great irony of the nineteenth 
century. A materialist conception of the body, propounded by political radicals, 
came to be broadly accepted. However, in its acceptance it formed the philosoph-
ical support for a wholesale mistreatment of the working class – exactly the opposite 
use to that which the radicals had in mind when developing the model.
Bentham played an ambiguous part in this historical process. Was he a hero or a 
villain of the common good? Commentators and historians have swung wildly from 
one conclusion to the other, depending on their political persuasions.25 hough 
historians’ conclusions about Bentham are luid, there is no doubt that the debate 
in which he participated – the controversy over witnessing and evidence – played 
a prominent part in nineteenth-century discussions about the alleged inhumanity 
of the factory system. he Tory MP Michael Sadler was the lightning rod that drew 
down the furore.
Sadler was greatly troubled by the lot of the poor and concerned about the condi-
tion of factory workers, especially children. In 1831 he took charge of the so-called 
10–hour bill in Parliament, which aimed to limit the amount of time worked by 
factory children, as well as prohibiting employment of those under the age of nine. 
It also included other features such as some very basic provision for the education 
of child employees, and a system of ines for employers found to have caused injury 
by negligence. However, Sadler’s passionate speech on behalf of mistreated young 
workers backired. Members of the House protested that his claims were exagger-
ated, and demanded a formal inquiry to ind out what conditions were really like. 
he resulting committee of MPs was headed by Sadler, and ater examining 89 
witnesses in 1832 it backed up his original claims. here was a public outcry at this 
revelation of poor conditions and cruel abuses occurring within factories. his did 
not go down well with Whigs – MPs and manufacturers – who quickly requested 
a second inquiry in the form of a Royal Commission. Its purpose was supposedly 
to verify the results of the Committee but in reality aimed to quash it by inding 
contradictory evidence.26
Both Sadler’s original Committee and the subsequent Royal Commission were 
criticised by their respective opponents, not just for the facts that they found but 
for the type of evidence they had permitted. By attacking the process of witnessing, 
or giving evidence, these critics nulliied the reports’ indings. hey echoed familiar 
themes of authority and credibility articulated by Bentham and his legal targets. 
Who was a reliable witness? What was a reliable kind of statement? What kind of 
evidence was admissible?
Andrew Ure complained that the Committee members would believe any old 
sob story rather than believe the evidence of their eyes, noting their ‘sentimental 
fever’ and ‘incredible credulity’.27 he report of the subsequent Factory Commis-
sion also criticised the evidence placed before the Committee. It implied that much 
of its evidence should have been ruled inadmissible on the grounds that its witnesses 
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were unreliable. Of three witnesses from Manchester, none was a doctor, manufac-
turer or clergyman (evidently the most reliable sorts of witness). he unreliability 
of the three was illustrated for the Commission by the fact that one was an atheist, 
another a tavern-keeper, and that the third – though yielding no dirt himself – had 
a colleague who had obtained a job with false references and had been convicted 
of a ‘gross assault upon a woman’.28 his was exactly the kind of thing that made 
Bentham so very angry.
Not only the witnesses, but the witnesses of the witnesses were called into 
question. he Committee was condemned because it was not composed of lawyers, 
experts in hearing and judging evidence, but by MPs. he Royal Commissioners 
were rejected as unreliable by trade union members on the grounds that they were 
lawyers used to the courtroom, not the factory, and had the wrong type of expertise 
to dig out the right kind of evidence. It appeared that many critics shared Bentham’s 
assumption that a properly run court case was the only acceptable model for an 
inquiry into the factory system, though of course what counted as ‘properly run’ 
was a matter of partiality. On the Whig side, mill owners complained that they were 
not given time to present their case, as they would have been in court. Likewise, the 
results of Sadler’s Committee were irst heard by many members of the House not 
in a formal Parliamentary announcement, but in the newspaper. For the Whigs, this 
was trial by the mob rather than by due legal process.
Amongst radicals and patrician Tories, there was another set of courtroom-
inspired critiques.29 he Commission was criticised because its hearing of evidence 
was not public, so not open to the informal judgement of the people. Its evidence 
was not taken on oath so that the full civic and religious obligation upon witnesses 
to tell the truth was not in place. Nor were witnesses cross-examined – the viva voce 
that Bentham rated so highly – to test their evidence. As if this were not enough, 
Bentham’s bête noire – unreliable written depositions – were also permitted. Of 
course, this privilege only extended to the mill owners, since most of their workers 
could not write. Factory owners were heard ater workers, so that they had the last 
word: an opportunity to deny and rebut the allegations of the workers. Because 
of the order in which evidence was taken, the workers had no such opportunity 
in relation to their employers. Finally, the self-interest of the factory owners in 
requesting the Commission (an illegal process according to some) made the whole 
thing biased. here was also legal precedent for excluding the evidence of witnesses 
whose interests would be served by the conviction of the defendant. In this case, 
the interest of mill-owning witnesses would be served by the exoneration of their 
system.
Democratic judgement, that possibility so tantalisingly extended by Bentham, 
had been withdrawn. he body was reconstructed as an inorganic entity for instru-
mental gain; the Iron Man was both a tool to discipline the workforce and a model 
for them to aspire to. he more workers could behave like machines the better they 
would it their immediate workspace and the entire political economy. With no 
soul, or at least a simple electric one, they would have no needs beyond the physical 
and measurable.
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Bentham’s reforms were in general not nearly so inluential as he hoped, either in 
Law or the other areas in which he thought they might be relevant, such as science. 
he radical democracy which he ofered was not taken up, and the inluence of 
rationalists like Godwin and Wollstonecrat faded away. Men of science wrought a 
careful compromise so as not to suggest that their work was too radical. heir new 
British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS) rooted itself irmly to 
Oxford and Cambridge, where all students had to pledge allegiance to the Church 
of England.30 he most important igurehead for the BAAS was William Whewell, 
and from his position of inluence he laid out new rules for scientiic epistemology, 
or the ways in which scientiic evidence should be judged. hese were developed in 
his Philosophy and History of the Inductive Sciences (1840 and 1847).
Whewell’s starting point for thinking about science was to divide it into two kinds 
of thinking: deduction and induction. Deduction was a useful tool, said Whewell, 
but it was not a method to enable any interesting discoveries in science. On the 
basis of this, Whewell built some bridges with the Romantics in the 1820s, who 
shared a repugnance at the mechanised reduction of modern life.31 For Whewell, 
worthwhile science had to involve more than the grindings of pure, mathematical, 
deductive logic. He dubbed the complement ‘induction’: the gathering and gener-
alisation of evidence, and an explanatory leap to postulate a law of nature. However, 
Whewell did not believe that inductive evidence self-evidently hung together to 
give the right answers. One needed more than just experience of evidence in order 
to reach the correct conclusion. Ater all, as he pointed out, was it not the case that 
the evidence of the senses showed the stars moving while the earth stood still? And 
yet every educated person knew that the opposite was the case; the stars only had 
an illusion of movement.32
To arrive at the correct conclusion, one needed to make the correct mental leap, 
that is, to have the right idea in mind to begin with: ‘he Ideas, the germs of them 
at least, were in the human mind before [experience]; but by the progress of scien-
tiic thought they are unfolded into clearness and distinctness.’33 Completing the 
process of induction was like making an inspired leap of understanding in relation 
to another person’s mind. One can never see the evidence of what is going on inside 
someone’s mind, but by observing their actions and getting to know them really 
well one can make that inal leap of intimate knowledge. When it came to science 
this was for Whewell – an ordained clergyman – a leap into the very mind of God.
By including this theological basis for science, Whewell implied that the set 
of people with the right kind of scientiic abilities were not political radicals and 
atheists. Oxford and Cambridge, with their Anglican foundations, were automati-
cally included as acceptable origins for scientiic knowledge.34 he BAAS was a self-
governed association with just enough freedom to let people pursue their ideas, and 
just enough discipline to make sure these ideas were politically acceptable. hus 
it avoided the dangers of political radicalism that lurked amongst the romantics 
whom Whewell had courted in the 1820s. Under Whewell’s direction, men of 
science regrouped and retrenched themselves in the 1830s and 40s as an elite group 
uniquely qualiied to pronounce on nature. In efect, they achieved precisely what 
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Bentham criticised so strongly in the legal profession. he BAAS was a scientiic 
elite that would protect its members’ ability to create, understand and apply knowl-
edge. Trust us, they said.
Distinctly not to be trusted was one Herr Teufelsdröckh: man of science, philoso-
pher, and cry-baby. In this character, the writer homas Carlyle satirised men of 
science, their place in society, and explored alternatives to their mechanical philos-
ophies. Teufelsdröckh is the elusive hero of Carlyle’s Sartor Resartus [he Tailor 
Retailored] which irst appeared in serial form in Fraser’s Magazine 1833–34 and 
was published as a single volume in Britain in 1838.35 It purported to tell the life and 
clothes-philosophy of Diogenes Teufelsdröckh, a German philosopher of the same 
Romantic school as Goethe and his contemporaries.
here are ive layers to the text of Sartor Resartus, and Carlyle exploited its episto-
lary form to foreground questions of credibility. On the outermost layer is the book’s 
supposed publisher, Oliver Yorke. Yorke was in fact one of a number of pseudonyms 
adopted by the editor of Fraser’s, William Maginn, between 1830 and 1836. he 
literary historian Melissa Frazier has explored how Fraser’s professed itself, with 
only partial credibility, to be ‘a little literary republic’ of democratic reading.36 he 
magazine announced ‘Honest Noll’ Yorke as its new editor, confecting an entirely 
spurious report about how this handsome man was democratically elected by a 
roomful of its (substantially female) readership.
Yorke presents a text supplied to him by its editor, the ‘author of the work’ and 
a igure so shadowy that he only communicates with Yorke ‘in some sort of mask, 
or muler’ and, Yorke supposes with ironic outrage, ‘under a feigned name!’ (14). 
his editor has had his biographical material supplied by one Hofrath Heuschrecke, 
whose name, Councillor Grasshopper, suggests that his chirruped information 
may not be of the highest quality. Heuschrecke has his evidence in the unusual 
form of six paper bags, stufed with assorted notes, lists, bills, trivia and occasional 
autobiographical fragments, all from Teufelsdröckh himself. he editor on several 
occasions notes his fear that there may have been some deliberate ‘mystiication’ in 
the illing and passing on of these unconventional archives (207).
Essentially, Teufelsdröckh’s Philosophy of Clothes is an ad absurdam extension 
of mechanical philosophy. If one is going to treat humans merely as bodies with 
factory-working potential, one may as well regard them simply as physical shells, 
which is to say, by their clothes. Clothes were also the inal product of the new 
factory system, whose Malthusianism, laissez-faire economics and utilitarianism – 
Bentham’s science of political economy – all come in for a drubbing. he problem 
is that the editor appears to possess Whiggish tendencies, so that Teufelsdröckh’s 
critiques are painful to him; the ‘professor’ (who has given no lectures, ever) appears 
to him ‘a speculative Radical … of the very darkest tinge’ (73).
Instead of the dull realities and generalities discovered by the eye, Teufelsdröckh’s 
science is based on beautiful, true ideas that appear in the mind, having their origin 
in some greater reality. his is the philosophy of idealism: ‘he beginning of Wisdom 
is to look ixedly on Clothes … till they become transparent’ (76). Observe until the 
right idea makes sense of it all; rise above mere generalisation based on the senses. 
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It is the Whewellian method, and indeed Carlyle had a good deal in common with 
Whewell. Both came of working-class backgrounds, yet aspired to a patrician kind 
of conservatism: a heartfelt rejection of mechanism, combined with a not always 
realistic romantic alternative. (Teufelsdröckh’s method, however, contains more 
nudity and dung than the Reverend would have countenanced.) he critic Gerald 
Bruns puts it that Carlyle intends his reader to see that the ideas of idealism must 
have their roots in a historical reality, rather than possessing a purely philosophical 
ontology.37
Sartor hardly presents German Romanticism as a credible alternative to mecha-
nistic philosophy. On this at least the doughty English editor is right: Teufelsdröckh’s 
philosophy is unreadable stuf, tortured and prolix. Nor is the reader inclined to 
trust Teufelsdröckh, due both to the untrustworthy nature of the sources and to the 
laughable nature of his character and history such as we have it. With a friend like 
the editor, Teufelsdröckh has no need of enemies. According to him, the philoso-
pher has ‘Genius … dulness, double-vision, utter blindness … manifold ineptitude’ 
(32–3). ‘here is much rubbish in this book,’ the editor is forced to concede (33). 
he editor explicitly declines to comment on Teufelsdröckh’s own garb (31), thus 
undermining his ostensible respect for the German’s philosophy in one stroke of 
the pen.
One suspects that some of what Teufelsdröckh says is supposed to be credible, 
but that Carlyle cannot bring himself to endorse it overtly.38 Sometimes Teufels-
dröckh scores palpable satirical hits, but Carlyle hides his opinions behind a joke, 
or behind a joke within a joke – and so on to a ive-fold complexity. Carlyle himself 
wrote to Fraser’s proprietor that Sartor,
contains more of my opinions on Art, Politics, Religion, Heaven, Earth and Air, 
than all the things I have yet written. he Creed promulgated on all these things, 
as you may judge, is mine, and irmly believed: for the rest, the main Actor in 
the business (‘Editor of these sheets’ as he oten calls himself ) assumes a kind of 
Conservative (tho’ Antiquack) character.39
However, the italicisation of the Carlyle’s ownership of and belief in the opinions 
expressed actually has the opposite efect to reinforcement, as does his introduc-
tion of the ‘actor’ who ‘assumes’ a role. His division of himself into editor and 
autobiographical subject, who are oten at odds with one another (not to mention 
Councillor Grasshopper and the paper bags) makes it impossible neatly to ascribe 
his opinions to one character or another.40
hough the democratic pretensions of Fraser’s have been shown by Frazier to 
be false in the ‘election’ of its editor,41 Carlyle’s layered book nevertheless extends 
the dialogic possibilities of reading to its readers. Carlyle himself called Fraser’s a 
‘blackguard Periodical’ but conceded that within it there breathed ‘a kind of mad 
morbid Life, perhaps a shade less hateful to one than the calm dry bones that smile 
on you their Death’s-head smile in most others’.42 He went on to airm the value of 
opening all perspectives to discussion: ‘Tories, Radicals, Whigs even, all the world 
is interesting to me.’43 A free-for-all rabble of reading was better than the silence of 
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consensus. hus the readings ofered by the text. Sartor is romantic and idealist like 
Whewell, but in its epistolary form it retains the possibility of democratic reading. 
he critic Lee C. R. Baker has dubbed Sartor ‘maeiutic,’ meaning that Carlyle ‘acts as 
a midwife to bring forth [the] realization which the reader himself achieves’.44 he 
reader can agree with Teufelsdröckh, or agree with him ironically, or agree with the 
editor, or read through his opinions to the opposite truth underneath, just as he or 
she pleases. Nor does the reader need to do the same thing consistently throughout 
the book. Like all good satire, there is no consistent object of attack, and no single 
perspective that is ofered as alternative. Everything at one time or another is up 
for satirical grabs, and the reader may pick and choose their jokes and their morals. 
Sartor is, as Carlyle states in its opening words, a ‘questionable little book’.
Evidence was ineluctably a political question in the Regency era. From the 1790s 
to the 1830s there was a perception in Britain that things might tip over into social 
revolt, perhaps revolution. hus any invitation to democratic judgement, or its 
withdrawal, carried political overtones. It was in this context of political tension 
that judgements in both science and literature had to be made. And they were 
judgements, not interpretations. Interpretations leave space for future amendment, 
but in times where order is threatened, a case needs to be closed once and for all. 
herefore jurisprudence was the pivot-point where politics, science and literature 
met. It was the perfect model for closure where the nature of evidential credibility 
was in question.
he judgements of science and literature were also connected for the simple 
reason that scientiic knowledge is, at some stage or another, always conveyed in 
written form. hus the scientiic question of evidence always entailed that of textual 
credibility.45 Considerations of literary criticism, whether explicit or implicit in 
experiments with literary form, were very much part of the debate about scientiic 
judgement. As I have demonstrated, epistolary novels leant themselves to a reading 
within a Benthamite framework whereby the levels interrogated one another, and 
the reader could enter into dialogue with the text.
Even ater idealism had scotched the temporary possibility of democratic episte-
mology in science, the possibility of democratic readings remained in literature.46 
Carlyle relected Whewellian idealism but did not buy into it in formal terms; 
Sartor Resartus, despite its subject matter, invited a reading closer to the Benthamite 
model. Literary texts cannot be neatly pigeon-holed as being in line with one episte-
mological method or the other (nor, indeed, were these the only two on ofer). 
Nevertheless, experiments with literary form, especially the techniques of narra-
tive nesting and epistolarity, invited readers to engage in dialogue with the text 
on various levels. Readers were the judges. hey formed their own opinions; they 
relected on the process of opinion-making; with the tiny rudder of the bookmark, 
they might even shit its course, as Carlyle suggested:
Nay, since Books, like invisible scouts, permeate the whole habitable globe, and 
Tombuctoo itself is not safe from British Literature, may not some Copy ind out 
even the [truth]; and gently force even him to disclose himself ?47
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